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ABSTRACT 
 
TRAINING BLACKBIRDS:  The International Administration of Kosovo 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
 
 This thesis will examine the efficacy of the international administration of Kosovo 
from 2008 to 2011. It focuses on two key issues: compliance with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and current efforts at liberalizing visa usage with the 
European Union. In order to assess both issues I use two-level game theory as a tool to 
investigate the organizations associated with compliance and visa liberalization. In the end I 
find that the structure of organizations that have the greatest effect upon the administration in 
Kosovo. The ICTY has a unitary structure that allows it to better exercise its wishes in 
Kosovo; whereas the EU is more fractured and has greater difficulty exerting itself 
consistently in Kosovo.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 In this thesis I will study the international administration of Kosovo focusing on the 
period after the country’s declaration of independence in 2008. I will use the framework of 
two-level games to discuss the efficacy of the international administration in two separate 
areas: ICTY compliance and visa liberalization with the EU. The structure of the 
organizations has the greatest effect on whether their message is conveyed effectively to the 
Kosovo government and, in the end, whether they can successfully implement their 
respective mandates. 
 The term administration will be used in the context of an organization that effectively 
controls some power of sovereignty that is usually reserved for the state. In a typical way of 
functioning the administration, the internationals continues to exercise the power over a 
portion of the sovereignty until they deem the local institutions able to competently operate 
\the powers before designated to the internationals.1 It is only the international administration 
that decides that enough has been accomplished for the locals to regain their sovereignty. In 
Kosovo the local government has yet to fully realize sovereignty from the international 
administration. 
 The question of international administration and the efficiency of its application is 
especially important now. Everywhere from Africa and the Middle East to South Asia, the 
                                                 
1 Jackson, Robert. “International Engagement in War-torn Countries.” Global Governance 10 (2004), p. 33 
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incidence of international administration is on the rise. And the case of Kosovo, being one of 
the first and thus furthest toward normal statehood, is useful to study and extract lessons for 
future uses of such administrations.  
 It is the structure of these administrations that matter most. The EU has such a 
complex coalitional structure that issues can come between member states that will adversely 
affect the ability of the administration to accomplish its mandate. Such a structure should be 
avoided in the future and in its place should be a more streamlined organization with a 
structure like that of the unitary structure of the ICTY.  
 
  
Two-Level Game Theory 
Any action or decision undertaken by an individual has ramifications for both that 
individual, and, also, for other persons connected to that individual. The same is true for the 
actions of states and international organizations. There are both domestic and international 
effects. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of such action, on these two levels, 
Robert Putnam developed the theory of the two-level game.   
The very notion of the two-level game is a metaphor for the actual process of 
negotiation and ratification at an international agreement. The largest actors in this 
negotiating process are the states or organizations that are trying to come to an agreement. 
But within those larger actors there are negotiators that deal directly with the opposite state 
and the ratifiers who deal with their own negotiator. In usual negotiations, the negotiators are 
in the international sphere or what Putnam calls Level I, and the ratifiers are in the domestic 
sphere or Level II.2 It is useful to think of the ratifiers as the constituents of the negotiator. 
They both appoint the negotiator and are represented by the negotiator, quite similarly to any 
politician in an electoral system.  
In order for an international agreement to be ratified it must be adopted by the 
negotiator and the constituents to whom the negotiator is responsible. Each level has its own 
set of circumstances that will allow for successful agreement. Putnam defines a win-set as all 
possible agreements to which both Level I and Level II would agree.3 Generally, larger win-
                                                 
2 Putnam, Robert D. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games." International 
Organization 42 (1988), p. 436 
3 Ibid., p. 437 
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sets make agreements more likely. Because any successful agreement must fall in the win-
sets of both states, agreement is possible only where win-sets overlap, the union of the sets. 
So, a larger win-set will mean that there are more possible points of agreement between the 
Levels, the larger the overlap between the win-sets. 
 
In Figure 1 we see an illustration of Level I win-sets and their union. In the figure, the 
win-set of country X is represented by the X characters, with XI being the ideal outcome for 
the state and XP representing the lowest possible outcome that the state can accept. The area 
on the line between XP and XI is the win-set for country X. It is likewise for country Y. Any 
possible agreement that will be made between the two negotiators will fall somewhere 
between their possible outcomes, or the area identified by the red arrow in the second line.  
Due to the dual nature of the political considerations during international 
negotiations, conceiving of the process as a two-level game is convenient for analysis. On the 
domestic level groups pressure the government to fulfill their interests with respect to the 
international negotiations. While, on the international level, the government attempts to 
satisfy their domestic pressures and minimize the adverse consequences of this satisfaction 
on the international stage.  
It is possible for an agreement to fail at ratification due to the possibility of defection 
by the actors involved in the bargaining process. In the realm of two-level games there are 
XI YP XP YI 
YP XP 
Figure 1 
the intersection 
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two forms of defection: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary defection occurs when an actor 
reneges on the ratification of an agreement “in the absence of enforceable contracts,”4 the oft 
cited Prisoner’s Dilemma. A more interesting defection is the involuntary case. It occurs 
when a negotiator is unable to deliver on a promised agreement due to the failure of 
ratification by the Level II constituents. It is often difficult to distinguish between the two 
forms of defection because the negotiator often has an incentive to portray voluntary 
defection as involuntary in order to enhance their bargaining position. Smaller win-sets make 
for a smaller intersection and thus involuntary defection by the negotiator more likely. 
 
Figure 2 represents a case of involuntary defection. Even the worst acceptable agreement for 
each country will not be accepted by the other and thus the Level II constituents will refuse 
to ratify an agreement.  
 The negotiator in Level I has an ideal outcome that might different form thatof their 
constituents. It cannot be assumed that the negotiator is a perfect conduit for the wishes of 
the state. A negotiator has a vested interest in the outcome of negotiations, mostly in finding 
an amenable agreement for their constituents, but also including their personal interests.5 
While taking their interests into account, they must at least be able to secure an agreement 
                                                 
4 Ibid., p. 437 
5 Mo, Jongryn. "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 38 (1994), p. 415 
XI XP YP YI 
Figure 2 
X win-set Y win-set
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that will not sacrifice their position as the negotiator. Thus negotiators must balance their 
personal interests with that of their domestic constituents. 
 The fact that the Level I negotiators have personal interests means that they have their 
own personal win-sets as well. An agreement that any state reaches must fall within the joint 
win-set of both the negotiator and his constituents. The same can be said for his opposite in 
the other state. Thus the overall effect of this added win-set is to create an even smaller 
possible area of intersection between the win-sets of the two states, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Here, the win-set of the negotiator of country X is represented by the Ns and the constituents 
by the Cs. 
  
In this instance, we cannot assign an ideal or a merely possible outcome for the state; it is 
only possible to see the overall win-set. This anomaly is due to the fact that there is 
uncertainty as to whether the ideal outcome will tend toward the constituents’ ideal outcome 
or that of the negotiator. That would have to be sorted out by the negotiator and the 
constituents. What is most important is that the overall win-set for country X has shifted from 
the larger set of Cs, shown by the red arrow, to the smaller win-set between NP and CP, in 
green. 
 Win-set size has a further importance. The size of the Level II win-set will affect the 
gains made by the state in any agreement made during the bargaining process. A constricted 
CI NP CP NI 
Both win-sets 
Overall win-set 
New win-set Figure 3 
Original win-set 
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Level II win-set can be a bargaining advantage for the Level I negotiator. If a negotiator has 
too large an overlapping win-set with his constituents, then the opposite negotiator can use 
this knowledge to gain a relative advantage during negotiations and still be sure that the 
agreement will be within the intersection win-set and be sure of ratification. On the other 
hand, a small Level II win-set can be an advantage by constraining a state’s overall win-set 
and allowing less room for the relative gains of the other negotiator in the final agreement. 
Thus a better outcome is achieved for the constrained state than might otherwise be achieved. 
This is a new version of the Schelling Conjecture.6 
 
 Figure 4 illustrates the effect of a constraint placed upon a negotiator of country X by 
his constituents. As in the first line, the initial and unconstrained win-set spans from YP to XP 
and is closer to neither ideal outcome. Once a constraint is introduced, it moves the union 
win-set toward the X ideal and produces relative gains for the constrained country.  
 The coalitions and preferences among the Level II constituents have a great effect 
upon the win-set. A coalition, in this sense, is a group of Level II actors that share a common 
position. A winning coalition is the group of constituents that give their support to the 
agreement brokered by the negotiator. The preference for an agreement among a coalition of 
constituents is associated with the cost of agreement and non-agreement among that 
                                                 
6 Schelling, Thomas. The Strategy of Conflict. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1960.  
XI YP XC XP YI 
YP XC 
Figure 4 
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coalition. A lower cost of non-agreement contracts the win-set due to the ability of the 
coalition to hold out for a better agreement without incurring much cost. However, different 
constituents have different costs for no-agreement. A Level I negotiator will have a better 
chance of securing support among a group of Level II actors and coalitions that have a high 
cost of non-agreement; they are his natural supporters.7 An agreement struck by a negotiator 
can meet opposition from those among his constituents who believe that the agreement goes 
too far in one direction, as well as those who believe that the agreement does not go far 
enough. Thus the negotiator cannot just take a simple “the more the better” approach. Among 
constituents, it is possible that those with the greatest interest in the agreement have the most 
extreme views; thus the negotiator may not find that this group is his natural supporter 
despite their keen interest in the passage of an agreement. 
 Level II institutions also play a keen role in the development of a ratifiable 
agreement. Ratification procedures affect the size of any win-set. There exists a great deal of 
difference between the win-sets and coalitions that form in a simple majority ratification 
system as opposed to a two-thirds majority system. Coalitions in a simple majority system 
might be smaller than those in a two-thirds system. Although the simple majority system will 
exert less significant domestic constraints and can lead to a less favorable, but quicker, 
agreement.  
 The relationship between the negotiator and the politics of Level II is often rocky. A 
Level I negotiator can be badly informed about his own Level II politics and even more so 
about the politics of the opposing negotiator’s constituents. This sort of misunderstanding is 
the situation that leads to involuntary defection; arising from a negotiator misinformed over 
                                                 
7 Putnam, op.cit., p. 442 
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the constraints placed upon him by the constituents and forcing a failed ratification. At the 
same time, a negotiator must understate the win-set of his constituents in order to secure a 
better bargaining position, in effect, faking a constraint.8 Although each negotiator is likely to 
know more about their own Level II politics than those in the other state; this is not 
necessarily true. Each negotiator must carefully tread a path between its own lack of Level II 
knowledge and the need to portray to the other negotiator that his constituents have a narrow 
win-set. In order to maximize the utility of a negotiation, the negotiator must show that the 
overall win-set of the state is “kinky”, or that the proposed deal is likely to be ratified while a 
less favorable deal will be rejected.9 A kink is the point, corresponding to XP or YP at which 
an agreement will no longer be ratified by a constituency. During negotiations it is unclear to 
both sides whether a kink actually exists or not, but a negotiator has an incentive to portray 
the situation as if one does.  
 The negotiator has the power to do this because he is often the sole link between the 
Level I and Level II in his state. This unique position leads to several interesting motivations 
of the negotiator. The extent of the role of the negotiator gives him an effective veto over any 
sort of agreement.10 Because the negotiator is the person that links the two levels, he is the 
one to table any agreement for Level II ratification, so it is unlikely that any deal could be 
struck that the negotiator does not support.  
 It is important to note that Putnam’s two-level game theory does not require that the 
actors at any of the levels be unitary. I refer to the actor, usually the negotiator, in Level I as 
a singular for convenience. If, for example, there are multiple actors on Level I, then the win-
                                                 
8 Ibid. ,p. 452 
9 Ibid. ,p. 453 
10 Ibid. ,p. 456 
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set that would need to be analyzed would be the intersection of all of their win-sets. This new 
combined win-set would then be the overall win-set for Level I as a whole. This can be 
generalized for any N actors and levels. 
 The Schelling Conjecture relies on completely perfect information on the part of the 
negotiators concerning the constraints of Level II.11 But, of course, there is never complete 
information. It is impossible for the negotiators to know exactly the level of constraint that 
exists on Level II. In one scenario, if he is not told the level of constraints, he may not be 
able to convey them to the other negotiator to prove his constraint and use it as a bargaining 
chip. Second, even if the negotiator is told the constraint of the ratifiers, the opposing 
negotiator may not believe that the constraints exist and ignore them. Last, even if the 
negotiator is told of the constraints he may not believe that they actually exist or he may 
choose to believe that they have a different quality than they, in fact, have, thus negating 
their bargaining advantage.  
 Although complete perfect information is impossible to achieve, the more perfect that 
the information about a constraint is, the better it will function as a bargaining advantage. 
The best constraint, thus, is a common knowledge domestic constraint. Furthermore, a 
constraint that is binding and permanent is the best form of constraint.12 If one negotiator has 
binding constraints and the other takes a strong stance in the negotiations, then the risk of 
involuntary defection is high. But now the opposite negotiator knows that the constraints are 
binding, so, in a successive round of negotiations, the constraints are clear and are nearly 
perfectly conveyed, and thus function as a bargaining advantage.  
                                                 
11 Iida, Keisuke. "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two-Level Games with Uncertainty." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (1993), p. 405 
12 Ibid., p. 412 
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 Previously, we have assumed, at least implicitly, that only one side of the negotiating 
process is constrained. Realistically, though, this is not true; in an actual negotiation, both 
sides will have domestic constraints that must be considered during the negotiations. Now we 
must compare the quantity of each side’s constraint. There are three levels of constraint in 
this model: high, middle and low. But there is not an effect on the theory of the variety of 
constraint. When one of the parties’ constraints are high and the other’s are either low or 
middle level, then the negotiator with the high constraints will always be at a bargaining 
advantage and receive a better outcome in the agreement.13 This mechanism works by 
forcing the negotiator with the lower constraints to offer the other negotiator a better deal 
than they would have otherwise done. But this constraint does not have to be absolutely high 
in order for this mechanism to work, only high in comparison to the constraint of the other 
negotiator.14 
As long as one negotiator has constraints higher than those of his opposite, he will 
then have a bargaining advantage. This, again, rests fundamentally upon the ideal of perfect 
complete information. Sometimes one might not be able to see clearly the constraints or 
desires of constituents and will thus lose that bargaining advantage. Realistically, there 
cannot be perfectly complete or incomplete information. Following the logic of Tarar’s 
argument for a range of constraint intensity, we can construct a similar range for the 
completeness of information. A constraint will have the greatest positive effect upon the 
bargaining position of a negotiator when it is both high and the information relaying the 
constraint is complete. If both negotiators have high, or similarly intense constraints, then the 
                                                 
13 Tarar, Ahmer. "International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 45 (2001), p. 329 
14 Ibid., p. 330 
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negotiator with the more complete information will, necessarily, have the higher benefit from 
the constraints.  
 
Application to Kosovo 
 The first reaction to the use of such an international relations framework to tease out 
insights into the domestic situation in Kosovo might be fairly negative. But the system in 
which Kosovo is governed and by which the political and legal institutions are created can be 
fairly described as international. As a state under international administration, Kosovo has 
unique institutions that allow for an international legal presence. In fact, the Kosovar 
constitution allows for the direct interference of the International Civilian Representative 
(ICR) in the law making process. Thus the international relations between countries of the 
European Union in the Council of the European Union and other international bodies have an 
effect upon the domestic situation in Kosovo through the ICR. 
 In this situation, the two-level nature of this system is clear. Level I, the international 
or negotiator level, in the previous discourse, is the “On the Ground” level. Here is where the 
negotiations happen between the representatives of the EU, the representatives of the 
Kosovar government and the other international actors. Their constituents, or Level II, are on 
the levels of the International and the Governmental. For the EU actors, they are the Council 
of the European Union and the European Commission, and occasionally actors beyond the 
EU such as the ICTY. These entities have differing responsibilities and competencies in 
Kosovo, but together they represent the full constituency of the international administration. 
The government, while being just as integral to the negotiations, has less strict divisions 
13 
 
between their constituents. It is impossible to separate the constituents of the government into 
sovereign entities like the states that compose the international constituents. 
 One might argue that this model is unable to comment upon the situation in Kosovo 
because it was designed for the international system. But this is far from correct. The main 
feature of the international system for which this model was designed is that of anarchy, with 
of no clear hierarchy between the actors. The same is true in Kosovo; while, in practice, 
some actors may have more political power than others at different times, the relative power 
that an actor has can change and thus there is a free hierarchy on Level I in Kosovo as well. 
This is to say that, in practice, neither a representative of the Kosovo government nor of the 
international administration has a fixed level of influence or negotiating leverage in every 
situation. There is movement among the actors depending upon the situation. Taking this fact 
together with the two clear levels of the system, I have shown that this model is perfectly 
suited for studying the current political and legal situation in Kosovo. 
The use of two-level game theory is of course a simplification of the real-world 
situation of international administration. In both of my cases I will only identify Level I and 
Level II actors. But it may be that there are further levels of constituents above the Level II 
actor. It makes sense that as long as there are others that an actor on Level II is trying to 
satisfy that there would be another level above it. This could also be generalized to an N-
level structure in trolley car-like fashion. But for the purposes of this paper two levels are 
adequate. Any constraints from a level above Level II can be assumed to be contained within 
the win-set of Level II. Thus, while sacrificing some robustness in the model, the 
simplification that I am using will not affect the overall logic of the mode
14 
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Kosovo: An Extremely Short History from 1980 – 2008 
 
  
Before the International Administration, 1980 – 1999 
 
 Marshal Tito died on 4 May 1980 and laid the foundations for the dissolution of the 
country that he had built after World War II. Prior to his death, in order to fill his place at the 
top of the political food chain, a federal presidency was created. Each federal unit had a 
representative as did the autonomous provinces of Serbia, which included Kosovo. The 
autonomy ascribed in the 1974 constitution basically gave Kosovo and Vojvodina the status 
of republics within Serbia while retaining their provincial character. In this system, each 
province had representatives in the assembly of Serbia, but no representatives from Serbia 
were in the provincial assemblies.  
The fact that decisions by the presidency had to be made by a majority of the 
representatives to pass forced the Milošević regime to revoke the autonomy of the provinces 
in what became known as the “Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution.” To gain control of the 
presidency Slobodan Milošević brought mobs to the streets throughout 1988 in Vojvodina 
and Kosovo to force out their current governments and, in their place, install Milošević-loyal 
governments.15 With the new governments installed, Milošević had both assemblies vote 
themselves out of existence effectively giving Belgrade control of three out of the eight seats 
on the federal presidency.16 
                                                 
15 Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin, 1997., pp. 58 - 62 
16 Ibid., p. 69 
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During the long collapse of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, Kosovo made several attempts 
to secede from the failing country as the other states successfully did. The first declaration of 
independence came on 19 October 1991. It was proclaimed by the Albanian members of the 
Kosovo Assembly, despite the fact that the provincial Assembly had been recently closed by 
Belgrade during the consolidation of central power. The declaration was pursuant to a 
referendum on independence that same year which had garnered 99.87 percent favorable 
votes.17 From then until 1999, Kosovo had a shadow government of the ‘Republic of 
Kosova’ that existed alongside the Yugoslav government.  
 Regular elections were held in this pseudo-republic without hindrance from the 
central government due to their engagement in conflicts elsewhere. In 1992, the intellectual 
Ibrahim Rugova was elected to the presidency of the republic. Rugova was an advocate of a 
passive and peaceful resistance to the Yugoslav regime. This policy was popular during the 
early part of the decade, but eventually patience began to wear thin. Especially after the 
exclusion of Kosovo from the 1995 Dayton Accords, which ended the fighting elsewhere in 
Yugoslavia, despite heavy lobbying by Rugova to the United States government.  
 The situation between the Kosovar and the Yugoslav governments began to 
deteriorate in 1996. In the month of February alone there were 580 cases of human rights 
abuses reported to international agencies.18 That year also saw an increasing militarization of 
the conflict. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) carried out its first military action in 
August around the Drenica region. And, in Priština, a parade was held in honor of Željko 
’Arkan’ Ražnjatović, the notorious paramilitary leader and war criminal, and his armed group 
                                                 
17 Judah, Tim. Kosovo: War and Revenge. New Haven: Yale UP, 2000., p. 65 
18 Pavlakovic, Vjeran, and Sabrina P. Ramet. "Albanian and Serb Rivalry in Kosovo." Ed. Tozun 
Bahcheli. Defacto States: the Quest for Sovereignty. New York: Routeledge, 2004., p. 86 
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the Tigers. Further exacerbating the rising tensions was the total collapse of the Albanian 
government and economy in early 1997. The poverty and desperation of the local military 
leaders in that country gave them the incentive and opportunity to throw open the doors of 
the armories and sell their stockpiled weapons to the KLA.  
 At this point, tensions began to form within the Rugova government over their 
continued pacifistic stance. The KLA was gaining more popular support and momentum, 
and, during the period of January to February 1998, the KLA perpetrated as many attacks as 
during the whole of the previous year.19 In March, the Yugoslav Army set out to capture the 
key KLA leader Adem Jashari. Arriving at his family’s compound in Prekaz and surrounding 
it, the Army then called for Adem to leave the house. When Adem did not appear, the army 
shelled the compound, leveling it and killing 58 members of the Jashari family.20 This 
massacre triggered the first concerted offensive from the KLA and signaled the beginning of 
the war proper.  
 Before the entirety of the Serbian police and army apparatus could reach Kosovo in 
July, the KLA held the majority of the western portion of the region. Once the larger Serbian 
force reached Kosovo, the state began its counter-offensive. Pursuing a scorched-earth policy 
in the areas taken by the KLA, the army drove 200,000 people from their home all the while 
the KLA refused to fight a battle that they would lose and fled into the neighboring countries 
and the high mountains. The massive refugee problem created by the army garnered the first 
real attention of the world press.  
 Once some critical attention focused on the situation, the war found itself in a general 
lull, with only minor attacks from both sides from the end of 1998 to the beginning of 1999. 
                                                 
19 Judah, op. cit., p. 137 
20 Ibid., p. 140 
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But in January 1999, the local police in Račak, in Southern Kosovo, executed 45 Albanians, 
including children, suspected of helping the KLA.21 Footage of the massacre played on 
international television showed the bodies of those killed and forced the governments of the 
West to take action.  
 A peace conference was arranged by the Contact Group, a loose organization 
comprising the United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, 
between the Kosovo government and Serbia at the Château de Rambouillet near Paris. 
Despite some progress towards ratification by both sides during February and March, the 
Rambouillet Accords were signed by only Kosovo, the United States and Britain with Serbia 
and Russia refusing to ratify the agreement. Broadly, the agreement contained two parts. The 
first called for an interim United Nations administration of the province, but leaving it 
technically within Yugoslavia. And second for a NATO force to patrol and keep order in the 
province without the inclusion of the KLA or the Serbian security apparatus.  
 By refusing to sign the agreement, the Milošević regime had opted instead for more 
violence. On 24 March 1999, NATO began a bombing campaign that lasted for 78 days until 
capitulation by the Serbian regime on June 3rd. The aerial attack gave the Serbian security 
and allied paramilitary units the cover they needed to complete a plan of ethnic cleansing of 
the province. On a tally from June 9th, 862 979 refugees had fled the country for Macedonia 
and Albania.22 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) met on June 10th and passed 
Resolution 1244. The resolution provides for a similar regime to that which the Rambouillet 
Accords envisaged, and, by the end of the day, the first NATO forces had begun to occupy 
Kosovo. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 194 
22 Pavlakovic and Ramet, op. cit., p. 88 
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From UNMIK to EULEX, 1999 – 2008 
 The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 provided 
the basis for the concentration of power under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). UNMIK had full executive and legislative authority in Kosovo with the policing 
and border security being controlled by the NATO force in Kosovo (KFOR). The 
responsibility for UNMIK was vested in the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG), who had complete executive authority within the territory.  
 The return of refugees from neighboring countries was swift and difficult in Kosovo. 
By November 1999, almost 800 000 of the refugees had returned to their homes.23With them 
had come a backlash against Serbs still in Kosovo and reprisal ethnic cleansing. Despite the 
reassurances of KFOR and the international community that their rights would be respected, 
many Serbs fled their homes for Serbia due to intimidation and fear of their new Kosovar 
neighbors and government. The only major area of current Serb settlement is north of the 
Ibar River in Mitrovica and in the south of the country around Štrpce. 
 The initial stance of the UNMIK administration was that the local Kosovar 
institutions, the government of the ‘Republic of Kosova’, were too weak to govern 
effectively. Thus UNMIK allowed little governance by the local population, only on a few 
minor local matters.24 This arrangement led to dissatisfaction by the Kosovars who felt that 
they were merely an occupied nation and led increasingly to calls for a constitution to be 
made for Kosovo. The Kosovars wanted a full constitution, but UNMIK and the international 
                                                 
23 Judah, op. cit., p. 286 
24 Tansey, Oisin. "Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage." Journal of Democracy 20 (2009), p. 156 
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community decided that a full constitution would lead to a still greater desire for 
independence from the still nominally extant Yugoslavia.  
 Even the international community could not decide easily as to the course to take in 
Kosovo. The United States advocated for a full constitution based upon the Rambouillet 
Accords, while the European partners wanted a slower process that might lead to a 
constitution in the future.25 In the end, a constitutional framework, as opposed to a full 
constitution, for provisional self-government was proclaimed by UNMIK on 15 May 2001. 
The framework created an Assembly of Kosovo, a Presidency of the Assembly and a 
President of Kosovo, all of which would be elected later in the year.  
 During the first election of 2001, Ibrahim Rugova was re-elected as the President of 
Kosovo. His Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), and the other major Albanian parties, the 
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) under Hasim Thaçi and the Alliance for the Future of 
Kosovo (AAK) under Ramush Haradinaj, formed an all Albanian coalition government in the 
Assembly. The election was the only one in which the Serb dominated North Mitrovica 
competed in the elections, with a Serb party garnering around 11.3 percent of the vote.26 The 
following nation-wide election in 2004 saw a Serb boycott and AAK and LDK creating a 
government without the PDK. In 2006, Rugova died of lung cancer and plunged his LDK 
into a leadership vacuum and intraparty turmoil. Thus, in the elections of 2007, PDK and 
AAK formed a government without LDK and elevated Hasim Thaçi as prime minister. 
 The question of the future status of Kosovo was pursued slowly by UNMIK. The 
administration pursued a policy of standards before status. UNMIK would periodically assess 
                                                 
25 Weller, M. Contested Statehood :Kosovo's Struggle for Independence. Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009., p. 181 
26 Tansey, op. cit., p. 157 
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how various benchmarks toward democratization and accountability were being met within 
the territory and, based upon their assessment, status discussions would be either accelerated 
or pushed back.27 By 2003, UNMIK announced that, at its present course, by mid-2005 
enough benchmarks would have been met to begin final status negotiations. For many 
Kosovars, this timetable was too slow and aggravated anti-Serb sentiments. In March 2004 
riots erupted in Mitrovica, which involved 50,000 Albanians and left 19 people dead, 954 
injured, 550 houses and 27 Orthodox religious buildings destroyed.28 
 The Norwegian Ambassador to NATO, Kai Eide, was tasked with investigating the 
incident and delivered a preliminary report in August, just five months later. The report 
found that some of the benchmarks were too difficult for the government to reach and had led 
to frustration with the standards before status process. The Eide Report advised that status 
talks be accelerated lest the lack of progress lead to further anti-Serb violence.29 
 The status talks began in early 2006 despite the lack of completion of all benchmarks 
set by UNMIK. From the beginning the talks seemed pointless; Serbia would not accept an 
independent Kosovo, while Kosovo would accept nothing but independence. The discussions 
were to generally follow the recommendations put forward in the Eide Report and to be 
followed by a report on a final Comprehensive Proposal that would be voted on in the 
Security Council. The Comprehensive Proposal was written by former Finnish President 
Marrti Ahtisaari and was presented by the Secretary General to the Security Council on 26 
March 2007.30 
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 What became known as the Ahtisaari Plan, had three main aims. It meant to create an 
independent Kosovo with great amounts of Serb autonomy and comprehensive redistricting 
in order to secure homogenous Serb areas. Finally, the Plan called for UNMIK to be replaced 
by an EU led mission with a similar objective, but no overall executive capacity. The Plan, 
though, was never voted on in the Security Council because of an explicit Russian veto due 
to the independence provision in the document.  
 The failure of the Ahtisaari Plan led to further negotiations in late 2007. It was headed 
by a Contact Group troika of negotiators from the EU, Russia and the United States. Despite 
creative attempts to break the impasse, no agreement could be reached.31 After the election of 
the former KLA chief Thaçi as prime minister in 2007, a declaration of independence seemed 
inevitable. On 17 February 2008, a unilateral declaration of independence was promulgated 
by the Kosovo Assembly. Adoption of the Ahtisaari Plan was mentioned by name in the 
declaration. Thus the Kosovars unilaterally paved the way for the end of UNMIK and the 
beginning of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).  
 The mandate of EULEX is less comprehensive than that of UNMIK; it is invested 
with executive authority in any few areas of its competence. EULEX aims to, “develop and 
strengthen an independent and multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and 
customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and 
adhering to internationally recognized standards and European best practices.”32 Because the 
mandate for EULEX is based on the Ahtisaari Plan and was only adopted by the Kosovar 
government in its declaration of independence and its constitution, the Serbs north of the Ibar 
River refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the mission and continue to recognize only 
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UNMIK authority. At stand-off like situation has been created with both UNMIK and 
EULEX having their own supporters and thus neither being fully capable to execute their 
missions in Kosovo.  
  
 
 
 
ICTY Compliance: the Case of Ramush Haradinaj 
 
 
ICTY Overview 
 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created 
by the UNSC in 1993 as an ad hoc court whose jurisdiction includes the entirety of the wars 
accompanying the collapse of Yugoslavia that began in 1991. It was the first court of its kind 
since the Nuremburg and Tokyo courts following the end of World War II. Because the court 
is authorized in its practice by UNSCR 827 (1993) under Chapter VII of the UN charter, it 
has the force of binding international law, but without an institutional enforcement 
mechanism that would allow the court to issue subpoenas and evidence collection processes 
in a way that forces compliance. 
 While the first indictment by the court came in 1995, the court had spent the previous 
two years developing its procedures and conducting investigations in the warzones. The 
Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the war in Bosnia, prescribed cooperation with the 
ICTY as one of the pillars of the treaty.33 Kosovo had seen little fighting during the wars, but 
because it was a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the rump pseudo-
successor to the socialist state that was comprised of Serbia and Montenegro, Kosovo was 
forced also to comply with the ICTY.  
The unrest that began in Kosovo during 1996, however, was initially seen as internal 
matter of civil discontent by the court, and thus not specifically under the purview of the 
                                                 
33 Kerr, Rachel. "Peace through Justice? The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia."Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 7.3 (2007), p. 380 
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ICTY. However, once the unrest reached a boiling point in 1998, the ICTY Prosecutor 
became involved deeming it to have reached the point of “armed conflict”; she declared that 
both sides in Kosovo would hence forward be held accountable to the ICTY and that 
investigations into war crimes allegations would begin immediately.34 Even after the 
autonomy that Kosovo gained during the international administration after 1999, the ICTY 
made it clear that Kosovo would still be considered under its jurisdiction as a continuation of 
the wars of succession that had begun in 1991.  
The initial investigations of war crimes took place in March 1999, following the 
massacres in the Drenica region. The first indictment against any individuals for their 
conduct in Kosovo came in May of that year, but without any effective international presence 
on the ground, save a few unarmed OSCE observers, there was little ability for arrests to be 
made on the indictments.35 This situation changed dramatically with the arrival of KFOR and 
the commencement of the work of UNMIK later in the year. After the arrival of international 
troops and police in Kosovo, investigations began with an amount of urgency heretofore 
unseen.  
With a UN mandated international administration, from 1999 – 2008 the ICTY 
operated freely with the cooperation of UNMIK. The establishment of EULEX and 
independence in 2008 did nothing to damage the ability of the ICTY to continue to operate in 
Kosovo. In fact, due to the nature of EULEX as a capacity building mission overseeing the 
creation and maintenance of institutions concerned with the rule of law, the training and 
oversight applied to the Kosovo Police (KP) has reflected EU policy. And, while the KP 
plays the lead role in operations in Kosovo, it is closely intertwined with the EULEX police 
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officers.36 The Council of the European Union has affirmed that it “support(s) the effective 
implementation of the mandate of the International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia.”37 
Furthermore, such supports for the ICTY are engrained in the mandate of EULEX.  
In order to fulfill the Mission Statement set out in Article 2, EULEX KOSOVO shall: 
d) ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, 
corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes 
and other serious crimes are properly investigated, 
prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to the 
applicable law, including, where appropriate, by international 
investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with 
Kosovo investigators, prosecutors and judges or independently, 
and by measures including, as appropriate, the 
creation of cooperation and coordination structures 
between police and prosecution authorities38 
It is interesting to note that war crimes are first on the list of crimes that EULEX is mandated 
to assist in investigation and prosecution. Such a placement ensures that war crimes are 
firmly in the realm of EU policy concerns. This mandate also ensures that EULEX supports 
the ICTY in its proper functioning. Thus the current EULEX regime is committed to the 
burdens placed upon Kosovo by the ICTY.  
 
Haradinaj et al. 
Ramush Haradinaj was indicted by the ICTY in March 2005 and surrendered to 
KFOR within days of his indictment, but before the indictment had even been made public 
knowledge.39 At the time of indictment, Haradinaj had been serving as Kosovar Prime 
Minister following the elections in 2004 and the formation of a coalition government with the 
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AAK, his party, and the LDK. He quickly resigned his ministerial position. It is a curious 
occurrence that a man at the height of his power would quietly and quickly give up his power 
for a prison cell. This is ever the more curious because of other cases where a powerful 
suspect runs from the ICTY for decades with the help of their state’s government. 
Haradinaj was an early convert to the cause of Kosovo independence. By 1998 he had 
already risen to the rank of Commander of the KLA region Dukagjin, which encompassed 
the towns of Peć and Dečan, and bordered Montenegro and Albania. The indictment charges 
that while Commander of the region, he and his two co-defendants engaged in a joint 
criminal enterprise that was aimed at establishing complete control of the region by unlawful 
removal of Serb civilians and the mistreatment of Albanian civilians.40 Furthermore, the 
indictment alleges that a “makeshift detention facility” was established near Jablanica, and 
that at the facility some detainees were subject to cruel treatment, murder, torture and rape.41 
During the trial, Haradinaj was allowed to continue his political work in Kosovo, but he did 
not return to his post as Prime Minister.42 
The trial ended in April 2008 with Haradinaj and one defendant found not guilty on 
all charges and acquitted, with the other defendant facing only minor jail time. Upon release 
Haradinaj went back to Kosovo and continued his political career. Nearly immediately after 
his release the new Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, stated to the BBC that “(my) office is not 
satisfied with the ruling. My office was unable to present all evidence to the court because 
some witnesses failed to appear.”43 Accusations of threats against witnesses continued to 
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mount and a retrial was ordered for both of the acquitted defendants on six of their 37 
charges.44 The retrial charges maintain some of those most serious charges, including torture 
and murder. The retrial is based upon the assertion that, at the time, the ICTY “failed to 
appreciate the gravity of the intimidation” that witnesses faced.45  
The arrest warrant, in this instance, was signed on 19 July 2010 and once again 
Haradinaj quickly surrendered to KP forces and was transferred to The Hague. During his 
current imprisonment, Haradinaj has been refused release for political purposes and has only 
recently been allowed to leave the detention facility to visit his pregnant wife for their child’s 
birth.46 It seems as though, this time, the ICTY is determined to make charges stick to the 
defendants and, with equal determination, to prevent the ability to directly intimidate 
witnesses into silence like the last trial.  
What this story illustrates is that the ICTY, an organization with a highly constrained 
and highly visible Level II win-set can positively influence their Level I negotiator to follow 
a course that it desires. The win-set of the ICTY is very small and very simple. It consists 
solely of its ideal outcome, II, the arrest and trial of individuals accused of committing war 
crimes. There is no room for movement for the ICTY, they will accept only that their 
indictment be carried out; thus the ideal and possible outcomes are the same point. It cannot, 
for instance, change the charges brought against an individual in order to better facilitate an 
agreement with another party. The other party must move to the ICTY’s ideal outcome, not 
the ICTY move closer to the other party’s ideal. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
It is also true that due to the public nature of ICTY proceedings, the constraint that 
the ICTY places is as completely signaled as any constraint might be, which is illustrated in 
Figure 6 by the fact that II,P is both the ideal and possible outcomes for the ICTY their win-
set is a singularity. After an indictment is published, the entire world knows exactly what one 
point is contained within the ICTY win-set. In the case of Kosovo, because it is under an 
international administration, the policies enacted by the Council of the EU also have an effect 
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statements, as well as in the EULEX mandate, the Council fully endorsed compliance with 
the ICTY. Thus, even though the Council controls the EULEX police officers, the win-set of 
the ICTY and the Council are exactly the same due to the provisions for ICTY compliance 
outlined above. And, due to the equally public nature of this pronouncement, it is known in a 
complete manner. The Council of the EU functions as a perfect conduit for the win-set of the 
ICTY to the EULEX police officers in Kosovo. 
One area where an extra element might be added to the win-set of the ICTY is during 
the decision to issue an indictment. As we have seen, once an indictment has been brought by 
the ICTY there is no room for negotiation, but what about before the indictment is brought? 
The decision to investigate a war crime, and the actual investigation that follows, falls on the 
Chief Prosecutor. Indictments issued by the ICTY are made solely by the Chief Prosecutor, 
but have to be confirmed by a trial judge.47 In the UNSC report that mandates the ICTY, the 
Prosecutor is setup as an entirely independent body. 
The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the investigation and prosecutions of persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.48 
 
And further, it notes that 
The Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she 
shall not seek to receive instructions from any Government or from any other source.49 
 
This independence seems to be true not only de jure, but also in practice. In her memoir, 
former Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte is very clear that political decisions did not 
                                                 
47 Del Ponte, Carla, and Chuck Sudetic. Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity's Worst Criminals 
and the Culture of Impunity : a Memoir. New York: Other, 2009., p. 41 
48 UNSC. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) 
(S/25704)., p. 22 
49 Ibid., p. 23 
31 
 
influence her decisions to indict. A bigger problem for the prosecution is governments where 
the investigations were taking place can be obstructionist during the process of evidence 
collection.50 It does not seem that this obstructionism ever prevented an indictment from 
being brought in the sense that the prosecutor was told to halt an indictment in order to 
satisfy a political end by political leaders in the UN or the EU.  
 It may be that this is a slight idealization of the nature of the Prosecutor in the system 
of the ICTY. They are, of course, dependent upon someone, namely the UNSC, for their 
appointment and funding of the ICTY. These actions might make the considerations of the 
Prosecutor different than just solely the mandate of the ICTY. Thus perhaps there are 
political pressures upon the Prosecutor, but there does not seem to be blatant evidence of 
political pressure informing the decision to indict. The environment in which the Prosecutor 
works may not be perfectly insulated from pressure, but is as perfectly insulated as any 
appointed post might be.  
Thus, by the time that the negotiations, as limited as they might be, even begin 
between the Kosovo and the EULEX representatives, the outcome has already been 
determined. The Kosovo representatives must comply with the ICTY ideal outcome, because 
there is no room for movement from that demand. The constraint of the Kosovo government 
that is placed upon its representatives does not matter, and so their possible win-set is equally 
insignificant. The Kosovo government faces the choice of conforming their own win-set to 
that of the ICTY or facing the costs of voluntary defection. Thus, no matter the constraint 
that the government might place upon their representatives to take a course of action that is 
different from that which the ICTY might like, the only possible agreement that might be 
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made is at the ICTY’ s ideal outcome. The actual Level I negotiators are unimportant, 
because by the time they figure into the process, the agreement has already been decided 
upon solely by the ICTY.  
The Level II actors in Kosovo do not have the means with which they might strike a 
different deal either. The Level II actor is the government and they owe their personal powers 
and sovereignty to the international community. And because of this dependence they cannot 
act against the will of the international actors when the win-set is thus particularly and clearly 
defined. There is no deal that the Level II actors in Kosovo might be able to strike that the 
international community would accept that is different from the win-set conveyed by the 
ICTY. And if the Kosovo Level IIs decide that they will not accept such an agreement, then 
they risk losing the sovereignty and powers that they have enjoyed to this point. Haradinaj 
exemplifies this. He had fought in the past for the sovereignty of Kosovo, and when it was 
guaranteed by the international community, he was unwilling to sacrifice the gains of the 
Kosovo government for those of himself.  
 Because of the special position as an internationally administered territory, the cost 
of voluntary defection for Kosovo would be great. The policy of standards before status, 
while, rushed on certain aspects, would never have allowed for a final status negotiation 
while the government of Kosovo was in non-compliance with the ICTY. Furthermore, the 
presence of international troops on the ground in Kosovo would have made any attempt at 
voluntary defection moot. Had the KP not taken any lead in arresting indictees and enforcing 
the will of the ICTY, KFOR surely would have.  
The threat of the KFOR is not merely implied; the Kosovo government established 
the legal presence of the International Military Presence (IMP) in their constitution. While 
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the IMP has never been implemented, because only Kosovo has adopted the Ahtisaari Plan, it 
shows the commitment the Kosovo government has to gaining political independence. While, 
at the same time, possibly sacrifice some sovereignty in the future and the ability to 
voluntarily defect from the win-set of the ICTY.  
1.2 Within means and capabilities, and until tasks can be relinquished to others under 
programmes to be agreed, the IMP will assist local authorities and the ICR in: 
g. Providing support, on a case-by-case basis, to the international community and key 
civil implementation organizations, in the fulfilment of their respective mandates.51 
 
This provision gives the IMP the basis under which it might operate in Kosovo. It is vague in 
scope and allows them to assist any and all international organizations with their respective 
mandates within Kosovo. In the next paragraph, the powers of the IMP are spelled out more 
clearly. 
2.1 In fulfilling the IMP's responsibilities, the Head of the IMP shall have the authority, 
without interference or permission, to do all that he/she judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the IMP and other designated personnel and to 
carry out its responsibilities. The Head of the IMP is the final authority in theatre regarding 
interpretation of those aspects of the Settlement that refer to the IMP.52 
 
The details of the scope of force that the IMP can use to enforce those aspects of the 
settlement that are breached on the ground are thus immense. Among those aspects is ICTY 
compliance.53 Thus, even without the aid of the Kosovo government, other mechanisms are 
in place for the forced compliance with ICTY indictments. Currently these mechanisms are 
under the purview of KFOR on the basis of UNSCR 1244.  
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This point is illustrated by the cases of Isak Musliu and Haradin Bala, both of whom 
were arrested by KFOR in 2003.54 While these two arrests occurred during the UNMIK era, 
the threat remains that fugitives will be arrested in Kosovo with or without the help of the 
Kosovo government. The threat is ongoing because of the nature of the Kosovo constitution 
and the place that is given to the IMP. Thus the Kosovo government would still incur the cost 
of voluntary defection, even if KFOR were to leave, while the perceived benefits of keeping 
suspects out of jail would not materialize.  
The case of Ramush Haradinaj clearly illustrates this constraint in the face of a clear 
and narrow win-set. As a powerful and well liked politician, Prime Minister Haradinaj would 
have been a perfect candidate for the government to aid in hiding from the ICTY. It would 
probably have not hurt his credibility much had he defied the ICTY. When he left for The 
Hague for his initial trial, crowds gathered to send him off.55 We can also see that, due to the 
rampant witness intimidation during the trial, it is not the great reach of the KP or EULEX 
police officers that forced Haradinaj to surrender to the police. It must be something special 
about the ICTY that has forced such strict compliance by the Kosovo government. It is 
because there is no room for movement within the win-set of the ICTY and that the costs of 
defection from the only possible agreement with the ICTY are too great for the Kosovo 
government to incur.  
Contrast the case of Haradinaj with that of Ratko Mladić, the Bosnian Serb general 
still on the loose.   The first indictment against Mladić was made in 1995 on the charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity for his role as commanding officer at the massacre of 
Bosniak men and boys at Srebrenica. After the war it was an open secret that Mladić was 
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living in Belgrade as a guest of the government of Slobodan Milošević.56 Reports continued 
even after the fall of Milošević that Mladić was being supported by the government and that 
even he continued to draw a state pension until 2005.57 He remains at large in Serbia with, it 
is assumed, with the help of friends in government.  In this example we can see the 
consequence of voluntary defection in the absence of high costs. Without an international 
police presence, the Serbian government made the decision to incur the costs associated with 
not turning over war criminals and even supporting them financially. They did so without the 
fear that another entity might arrest the suspect without their approval. In a state like Serbia, 
where the sovereignty of the state is not in question, they can much more easily bear the 
weight of defection. They cannot ultimately lose their sovereignty by defecting; the costs 
cannot be their entire state barring some sort of international invasion. Kosovo, on the other 
hand, can lose their state more easily and will not choose defection quickly.   
It is interesting to note that, without the support of the state, there has never been a 
fugitive of the ICTY who has been long on the lamb. The two remaining fugitives, Ratko 
Mladić and Goran Hadžić, received help from the Serbian government for years and now 
probably live in Serbia with the support of some people in government. Tuđman’s Croatia 
supported Ante Gotovina in his initial bid to escape justice, but he was eventually caught in 
2005. Kosovo, because of its unique position, has never had an indictee that has resisted 
arrest by the ICTY for any amount of time similar to the Serb or Croatian examples.  
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Visa Liberalization: Not for Kosovo 
  
Why Liberalize? 
 The goal of visa liberalization, in the context of the European Union, is to allow the 
citizens of a country not part of the EU to travel freely within the Schengen zone (which 
includes 25 EU members, plus Norway and Switzerland, but excludes the UK and Ireland) 
without the need to apply for a visa. To do this the country must fulfill certain requirements 
that are set for it by the EU. These requirements include readmission of citizens found to be 
in the EU illegally, strict guidelines for the issuance and manufacture of biometric 
documentation, and secure border control.  
 Despite the legislative and technical difficulty associated with the task of meeting 
these requirements, most candidate countries are more than happy to fulfill them. For a 
candidate or potential candidate country, the essential laws and policies that liberalization 
requires are also parts of the Justice and Home Affairs pillar of the acquis communitaire, and 
so will have to be dealt with to become an EU member in the future. Additionally, without 
liberalization, citizens have to go through a lengthy process of visa application in order to 
travel to the EU and are thus less likely to do so. The difficulty attached to travelling to the 
EU can have a negative effect upon the European integration process within a country. 
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Furthermore, in most instances, trade between the two areas increases dramatically after visa-
free travel is introduced.58   
General Framework for Liberalization 
 In the past, the journey toward visa liberalization has had several clear and straight 
forward steps. The first of which is the conclusion of a visa facilitation and readmission 
agreement with the Council of the EU. The second is the beginning of a visa dialogue. And 
last, before the liberalization process is complete, the roadmap of specific reforms that need 
to be implemented.  
 The initial step, that of conclusion of a visa facilitation and readmission agreement, is 
a way for the European Commission and the other country to streamline processes involved 
in migration between both entities. On the facilitation side of these agreements, the idea is to 
expedite and ease the process of obtaining short term visas for citizens of a country to the 
Schengen zone. The agreements offer to a set of people, usually businessmen and travelers, a 
greatly eased process of visa application.59 A second portion of the agreement, that of 
readmissions, aims to ease the process of returning citizens who are found to be in the EU 
illegally to their home country.  All countries of the Western Balkans, except Kosovo, that 
did not already have a facilitation and readmission agreement already (Serbia,60 Montenegro, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania) received their agreements in 2007.61 
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 After the successful implementation of the facilitation and readmissions agreement, 
the visa dialogue is the next step toward full liberalization. The dialogue is much more 
informal than the other two steps. It is the process through which the European Commission 
in its capacity as the EU bureaucracy assesses the steps that need to be taken in the areas of 
document security and border security that will lead to eventual visa liberalization. The 
dialogue seems to be mostly an action of good faith that the country will one day gain visa-
free access to the Schengen zone, but does not necessarily have to be so. 
 After the dialogue is finished and the EU has assessed the situation in each country, a 
roadmap is given by the Commission that outlines the specific reforms that a country must 
implement in order to achieve full visa liberalization. Most of the roadmaps for the Western 
Balkans are similar if not identical.62 Though each roadmap has specific blocks related to the 
situation in the individual country, the roadmap generally focuses on the areas of documents 
and border security. The Roadmap step is the most important and difficult part of the process 
because, after the completion of the reforms outlined in the roadmap, a proposal is then sent 
by the Commission to the Council of the EU for the final approval of visa-free travel.  
 The vote by the Council of the EU is the end of the visa liberalization process. The 
Council must vote because access to the Schengen zone is controlled by Regulation 574/1999 
on the visa requirements for nationals of non-EU member states.63 This law contains two 
annexes. The first is a ‘black list’ which enumerates all of the countries whose citizens 
require a visa to enter the Schengen zone. The second is the ‘white list’ that contains the 
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countries whose citizens may travel visa-free to the zone.64 It is the white list to which all 
Western Balkan countries aspire and onto which they eventually made it (Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia beginning in 2010; Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
2011).  
 
A successful process: the Serbian example 
  Serbia, unlike Kosovo, has undergone a fairly normal path toward visa liberalization 
with the EU. The visa dialogue that began with Serbia in 2008 was the first in the region, and 
was always seen as a first step toward further and full visa liberalization. European 
Commission Vice President Franco Frattini said on the day of the launch, “I am happy to be 
here in Belgrade today, where we take this important step together towards our common 
European future. I welcome the launch of the dialogue on visa free travel which should open 
the doors of the EU to all citizens of Serbia.”65 
 The roadmap was presented to the government of Serbia on 7 May 2008 and gave the 
exact reforms needed to establish the visa free regime. Delivered to Belgrade by another 
European Commission Vice President Jacques Barrot, the reforms fall into four categories, 
called blocks: document security, illegal immigration including readmission, public order and 
security, and external relations and fundamental rights.66 The roadmap ends with further 
promises to Serbia. 
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As already mentioned before, on this basis the Commission will consider the possibility to present a 
proposal to the Council for the lifting of the visa obligation, by amending the Council Regulation 
539/2001[an amendment to 574/1999], and, following the procedure laid down in the EC Treaty for 
these matters, the Council will on the basis of the Commission's proposal, after consultation of the 
European Parliament, take a decision acting by qualified majority.67 
 
In July 2009, the Council voted for the proposal that allowed Serbian citizens with correct 
identification to travel to the EU without a visa beginning on 1 January 2010.68 The ‘visa 
ghetto’ that existed on Europe’s doorstep in 2007 has been reduced to only Kosovo and its 
two million citizens.  
 
Kosovo: Less than success 
 As with all other states in the region, eventual visa liberalization in Kosovo must start 
with a visa dialogue that would then lead to a visa roadmap and full liberalization. The 
process, though, is stalled. There is no dialogue, and as recently as October 2010, the EU has 
said that Kosovo is not ready for a dialogue.69 Without this dialogue, Kosovo cannot 
implement a coherent strategy toward reforms that might lead toward eventual visa 
liberalization. 
  In late 2010 the European Commission Liaison Office in Kosovo released a 
Factsheet that described the ways in which Kosovo needed to reform in order to even begin a 
visa dialogue with the EU. The Factsheet is quite unlike the roadmap that Serbia received. 
The specific reforms are not clearly defined and is without guarantees of visa liberalization. 
Furthermore, unlike Serbia and the other Western Balkan countries, Kosovo must fulfill more 
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criteria in order to begin the dialogue. Pulled from a previous Commission statement, the 
Factsheet says, 
Kosovo needs to adapt its legislation, strengthen its administrative capacity to process readmission 
requests and implement an effective reintegration strategy. It also needs to enhance the security of its 
borders and secure the management of civil registries and the issuance of documents.70  
 
Serbia, as we have seen, only needed to have readmission settled before a dialogue and 
roadmap were started. For Serbia, the further reforms were not a price of the dialogue, but 
instead were a price of admission to the Schengen zone. Thus it appears that the EU is 
treating Kosovo differently than the other countries of the Balkans. They have to complete 
reforms, that are usually implemented once a roadmap has been given, before the process can 
even begin. 
 Despite the backwardness of this process, the Kosovo government has gone ahead 
and unilaterally affected many of the reforms that the EU wants. Reforms have occurred 
despite the vague nature of the calls from the EU. Kosovo has made progress in every area 
given to it in the Factsheet. After the declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo began 
dealing with the readmission of its citizens from foreign countries on its own (previously 
UNMIK had been in charge). Since then, Kosovo has established bilateral readmission 
agreements with nine European nations and is set to continue on this track.71 This sort of 
non-guided reform continued with a law passed in June that entered into force in August 
2010. The law “defines the procedures for verification and return of Kosovo citizens and 
foreigners who crossed in transit from Kosovo to other countries.” 72 If Kosovo were like all 
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the other countries of the Western Balkans, this reform alone would have been enough for a 
visa dialogue.  
 In the area of border security Kosovo has made strides as well. Due to the nature of 
EULEX as a rule of law mission focused on capacity building of the police and customs 
services, it seems strange that Kosovo has no clear way forward when it comes to border 
security. With an actual EU mission controlling some of the key institutions for visa 
liberalization, Kosovo should have a simpler time ascertaining the specifics of reform that the 
EU wants them to implement and not a harder one.  
The Kosovo Border Police have the limited role of surveilling the border with 
Albania and controlling the crossing points not connected to the Mitrovica enclave.73 The 
Kosovo government, though, hopes that soon the Border Police will control all of its 
international borders. The government has begun to undertake seven action plans toward 
integrated border management.74 The content of these action plans are similar to those 
implemented under a roadmap. Yet in November 2010 the Commission stated that despite 
some progress being made in border security, “[integrated border management] 
implementation however needs to be speeded up.”75 In previous cases such a requirement has 
only been made following the conclusion of a visa dialogue.  
 The last area mentioned in the Factsheet, the “secure management of civil registries 
and the issuance of documents” has also been tackled by the Kosovo government, although 
this is the area that needs the most work. The initial difficulties with civil documents date to 
the 1999 war with Serbia. When Serb troops withdrew they took many of the documents and 
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registries with them.76 A further blow to document security is the fact that old Yugoslav 
passports are still valid for Kosovar citizens. These older documents do not display any of the 
security features used in newer passports. But, according to the Commission new Kosovo 
“passports, identification cards and civil status documents have high technical security 
standards.”77 However, the civil administration involved in implementing the new law on 
personal data protection, instituted on 29 September 2010,78 is not yet in place. The EU 
believes that these deficiencies must be addressed before the visa dialogue might start. The 
problems with the security of documents is real in Kosovo and much needs to be done before 
visa liberalization can be completed, but document security is normally included in the 
roadmap process and has been a precondition for a dialogue only with Kosovo.  
 Kosovo has made progress toward meeting the preconditions for a visa dialogue, but 
in November 2010 the process was stalled further by a new qualification from the EU: 
reintegration of readmitted citizens. This is a further qualification after readmission; 
reintegration is a plan for helping readmitted citizens to find work and housing. According to 
Balkan Insight, a regional news source, the European Commission will not begin a visa 
dialogue until a reintegration plan is in place.79 The National Refugee Commission’s new 
Strategy for Reintegration of Repatriated Persons that began in June 2010 has not been 
enough to satisfy the EU.80 According to the Commission, the reintegration strategy fails on 
several accounts: 
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Reintegration remains a challenge and further efforts by Kosovo authorities are 
necessary. Capacity to handle reintegration of forced returnees needs to be strengthened. 
Communication between central and municipal levels on readmission is insufficient. The 
municipalities do not have adequate human and financial capacity for providing sufficient assistance to 
repatriated persons.81 
 
Despite the need for a full realization of the Strategy, the problems that the EU has with the 
new Strategy are not insurmountable. The issue though is not that the tasks required to 
complete the reforms are difficult, but that they are being put in a more difficult order for 
completion in Kosovo. In the past reintegration has logically followed readmissions.  
The levels of the game that describe the win-set structure for visa liberalization are 
different than those for ICTY compliance. Level II is occupied by the Council of the EU and 
the European Commission on the one hand and the Kosovo government on the other. The 
decision to add Kosovo to the white list is eventually the Council’s decision; they are the 
highest level on the European side. But strangely the level of negotiation is the EC Liaison 
Office not a Council body. As the publishers of the Factsheet and the entity used to inspect 
the progress of Kosovo toward applying the acquis communitaire, they are the ones 
informing the Commission about reforms in Kosovo. The Council has no direct control of the 
Liaison Office since it reports to the Commission even though the Council is the body that 
would have to accept the changes to the white list.  
In Kosovo, it is the Ministry of European Integration that is responsible for applying 
all of the acquis communitaire guidelines and bringing Kosovo closer to European standards 
of practice set forth by the Commission and is thus the Level I negotiator. Among the 
standards are those required for visa liberalization. The Ministry was created in April 2010 in 
preparation for the eventual filing of the Commission questionnaire, a first step toward EU 
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candidate status.82 The Ministry works closely with the Commission to fulfill the criteria 
necessary for further integration. The two-level structure for visa liberalization and EU 
integration in general is illustrated in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 
 In this instance the sacrifice of only using two levels is most apparent. While it is the 
Commission that decides whether visa liberalization might be voted upon by the Council, so 
the Commission is Level I and the Council Level II, the Council has further clear constituents 
as well. The Council is composed of ministers of the member countries who are politicians in 
their own right and must be elected or appointed by their home country. Thus they have a 
further constituency in their respective capitals. To include a third level would give us a very 
robust view of the nature of the EU structures, but is not necessary for my argument. Any 
                                                 
82 Ministry of European Integration, History of Kosovo EU Relations, http://mei-ks.net/?page=2,10 
Level I
Level II The Council of the EU
The European 
Commission
Level II
Level I Ministry of European Integration
Kosovo 
Government
46 
 
sort of constraint placed upon the Council by their constituents can be reduced to an innate 
character of the Level II win-set.  
The structure of the EU side of the diagram contains a peculiarity through which the 
Commission and the entire win-set of the EU when it comes to visa liberalization is 
constricted. Because the regulation that controls access to the Schengen zone has to be 
amended by the Council, and is overseen by the Commission, the win-set of the EU by the 
time that it is presented at Level I has been contracted from its original size. Since both the 
Commission and the Council have unique win-sets, the overall Level II win-set for the EU is 
the intersection of both individual sets and is contracted further than each individual win-set 
might be. Thus the overall win-set thus is smaller and more difficult to find an amenable 
agreement with the Kosovo negotiator.  
To date the journey of Kosovo toward visa liberalization with the EU has had three 
distinct phases that are specific to Kosovo. The first was before anything concrete was said 
by the EU, and Kosovo operated under the assumption that it would be treated like the other 
West Balkan states and that it needed to conclude only basic readmission reforms before a 
dialogue would start. The second phase came after the Commission statement published in 
the Factsheet became public knowledge and Kosovo then had specific areas upon which to 
focus reforms. The third and final phase began after the movement toward a visa dialogue 
stalled due to the lack of an effective reintegration strategy. 
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 Figure 8 represents the first phase win-sets of both the EU and Kosovo before any 
official statements had been made on the subject of visa liberalization. Here Kosovo is 
operating under the assumption that having a readmissions agreement would be enough to 
start a visa dialogue. KP is the greatest possible reform that Kosovo has the ability to enact 
and EUP is the lowest possible amount of reform that the EU would accept to begin a visa 
dialogue. Thus the intersection, between KP and EUP, is the place where an agreement on 
readmissions would lead to a visa dialogue. While the Kosovar government does not know 
exactly where is EUP, the threshold beyond which an agreement might be reached, it can at 
least infer the placement from the context of the Western Balkan countries. The possible 
point ought to be located at the conclusion of a basic facilitation and readmissions agreement 
with the EU.  
 
 After it becomes clear that Kosovo has to meet other requirements in order to begin a 
visa dialogue, unless those other requirements are clearly articulated, as in a roadmap, the 
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possible EU point, EUP, is unknown and the Kosovars do not know where an agreement 
might be reached, which is illustrated in Figure 9; this figure represents the beginning of 
phase two. In this instance, it can be assumed that the point EUP has moved toward the EU 
ideal point, because further reforms would make it move closer to the acquis communitaire 
standards. The problem, though, is that without a clearly explained format and direction for 
reform, the EU has left the location up to guess work where the threshold for the beginning 
of a visa dialogue will start.  
 The Schelling Conjecture83 would usually positively support a movement toward the 
ideal outcome for the EU. The movement would positively constrain the bargaining position 
of the EU and force Kosovo to come to an agreement that would be closer to the ideal of the 
EU. However, because the EU is not signaling to Kosovo where exactly their possible 
outcome is, Kosovo cannot make any sort of agreement for visa liberalization. So instead of 
positive constraint, the constraint is leading to involuntary defection on the part of Kosovo 
and to no agreement at all.  
 This trend toward the unknown has continued with the further shutdown of talks over 
reintegration strategy in phase three. After the Kosovo government at least attempted the 
reforms that are outlined in the Factsheet, the EU again decided that the reforms were not 
enough, as detailed above. We can again assume that the new EUP has moved to the left, 
because there are new preconditions for a visa dialogue that would bring Kosovo closer into 
line with the acquis communitaire. But there is still no way to know how far it has gone 
toward the EU ideal. In this instance, Figure 9 represents this uncertainty equally well. It 
might be that the EUP point has moved beyond KP and possible union with the Kosovo win-
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set into the realm of involuntary defection, because the Kosovars cannot deliver enough 
reform to satisfy the preconditions for a visa dialogue. If that has occurred, then the EU is in 
jeopardy of failing in its attempt to set Kosovo on the path to modern European statehood.  
 The EU is delivering its preconditions for Kosovo to begin its visa dialogue in a 
muddled fashion. Very unlike the ICTY, the EU is portraying its possible acceptance point of 
reforms in an imperfect manner. The Kosovo government has no idea how many and how 
great of reforms it needs to implement to begin a visa dialogue. The only thing known is the 
sector that needs reform. And when the EU does attempt to communicate its threshold of 
acceptance, it does so in such a vague manner that the reforms instituted by Kosovo might 
never be enough. For Kosovo it seems as if it is trying to hit a moving target, since every 
attempt at satisfactory reforms has failed. Such an involuntary defection scenario is a waste 
of time and money for Kosovo, because it is impossible for Kosovo in implement satisfactory 
reforms. Especially because this means that no matter the reforms, the EU will not offer visa-
free travel to the Schengen zone. 
The sovereignty of Kosovo is not fully accepted by all members of the EU and might 
account for the discrepancy in visa liberalization. If it were only those member states that did 
not recognize Kosovo as independent that are inhibiting the beginning of a visa dialogue, 
then Kosovo citizens ought to be allowed visa free travel to the EU as Serbian citizens. Since 
they accept that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia then all peoples living in Kosovo are 
citizens of Serbia. The agreement that allows Serbian citizens to travel to the EU specifically 
forbids residents of Kosovo from doing so.84 Kosovars can obtain Serbian passports, but 
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through a special division of the Serbian Interior Ministry that gives different passports than 
those usually used by Serbian citizens.   
The current situation speaks to reasons not completely tied to the non-recognizing 
states. The fact that Kosovo citizens are particularly excluded from using a potential Serbian 
passport to travel to the EU means that it is not merely those countries within the EU that do 
not accept Kosovo independence that are delaying the beginning of a visa dialogue. It would 
seem that they should support the use of Serb passports for Kosovars. Such an action would 
help to bolster Serbia’s claim to the region. Thus the non-recognizing members of the EU 
should not, on principle, be averse to the idea of Kosovars traveling visa-free to the EU. They 
are not the sole reason for the current malaise of Kosovo’s visa liberalization process.  
The other side of the coin in the EU is those countries that do recognize the 
independence of Kosovo. They will not want visa liberalization at any cost, and would see 
the forced usage of Serbian passports to travel to the Schengen zone as contrary to their 
belief in the full independence of Kosovo. Thus within the Council there is a split among the 
members as to what policy they should pursue. The win-set that exists under such conditions 
cannot help but be unclear and imperfectly portrayed. An entity that cannot decide where its 
own ideal point is will also not be able to decide on a possible point either.  
 It is unclear why the EU does not give a straight indication for why the visa dialogue 
cannot start in Kosovo. It is not as if the dialogue is necessarily a promise of eventual visa 
liberalization, which usually comes with the roadmap. What the EU has decided to do instead 
is an almost informal dialogue that leaves both sides without a clear vision for moving 
forward. It might be that the EU, or certain member states, does not want to allow visa-free 
travel for the citizens of Kosovo. But such an intention would be myopic in the extreme and 
51 
 
threaten the success of the largest ESDP mission to date. EULEX has a vested interest in the 
success of the Kosovo project. It partially shares in the duties associated with sovereignty in 
Kosovo and has no clear reason for wishing Kosovo to have no path forward for visa 
liberalization. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The two examples discussed above, ICTY compliance and visa liberalization, offer 
glimpses into the way that international administrations can function effectively and the way 
that they might lead to a failure of complete transition to normal statehood. The failure of the 
EU to engage productively with Kosovo and the success of the ICTY in implementing its 
mandate is due to a disparity in institutional structure. The conclusion will also discuss some 
potential reasons that there is no movement one way or the other on visa liberalization and 
what the potential consequences of non-liberalization might be. First, I will look into what 
this new information might mean for this sort of application of two-level game theory in 
general. 
The structure of the international administration in Kosovo and that of the 
international organizations themselves have lent themselves particularly well to the use of 
two-level game theory to understand their functioning. The basic idea of the win-set to 
describe the set of agreements that a given level of an organization will accept in a 
negotiation. The varied amount of levels upon which the concept of the win-set functions 
only compounds its theoretical power. It can give us a framework with which we can discuss 
large organizations while not losing the particularities of the organization. The EU is 
extremely complex with different parts of the organization operating in separate 
competencies that can make it difficult to assess the organization as a whole. Two-level game 
theory allows us to look at an organization as a sum of win-sets with the intersection of all of 
the win-sets as the overall organizational win-set. Without such a tool it is nearly impossible 
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to encompass an entire organization succinctly and in a fashion that is useful for simple 
study.  
The win-set structure of the ICTY in the context of Kosovo is very determined; it is 
determined in the sense that there is no contraction of the win-set from level to level. Each 
level of the win-set structure of the ICTY clearly conveys the information given to it by the 
level above it. The win-set structure associated with visa liberalization is instead complicated 
by each successive level of the structure and constricted negatively. In their structure each 
level is much more indeterminate with respect to the win-set that they convey compared with 
the win-set from the ICTY.  
The ICTY win-set starts when the ICTY decides to bring an indictment against a 
suspect on the judgment of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor is appointed by the UNSC and is 
given a four year term of office that can be renewed. After the appointment there is no 
effective measure to remove a Prosecutor that is following the mandate of the ICTY except 
refusing to reappoint them. Consequently, there is no natural constituency for the Prosecutor 
to continuously satisfy during the process of filing an indictment. The Prosecutor has sole 
authority to issue indictments and has no constituency to which they are responsible and thus 
does not have to take into account constituents’ win-set when making decisions on 
indictments.  
In order to implement its decisions in Kosovo, the ICTY must enlist the support of the 
Council of the EU, which has been given without caveat. In most situations, when another 
level is added to the structure, the overall win-set of the organization would contract because 
both levels have an indeterminate win-set and their intersection is smaller than that of each 
individual. But the ICTY and the Council have a special relationship in which they have the 
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exact same win-set. On the ground, it is EULEX who receives its information for possible 
win-sets from the Council. While the added level of EULEX ought to contract the overall 
win-set as well, it also receives a singular win-set from the Council which cannot be 
contracted further.  The singular win-set is nearly perfectly conveyed to all involved, from 
the ICTY all the way down to the EULEX and Kosovo governments. And thus the win-set 
structure of the ICTY can efficiently convey and implement its win-set because each level is 
determined by the one above it for its own win-set. 
The indeterminacy of the win-set structure in the case of the European Commission 
and the Council of the EU is due to the institutional structure of the Commission and its 
Level I negotiators in Kosovo. The European Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo is the 
Level I negotiator for the visa liberalization negotiations. They are directly overseen by the 
Commission and are charged with implementing Commission and EU policy concerning 
enlargement and acquis implementation. The Commission meanwhile is composed of 
Commissioners that are appointed by their home countries, each country has one 
commissioner, and that must be approved by the Parliament of the EU.85 Furthermore, the 
Parliament must approve a Commissioner and has the right to remove the Commissioners 
through censure, the Commission has a constituency in the Parliament.86 A win-set that 
originated in the EC is negatively constricted by the time that it reaches the negotiations table 
in Kosovo because of all of the constituents that must be satisfied by an agreement. The same 
can be said of the Council with their constituencies in their home countries.   
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Before a win-set on visa liberalization is even decided upon by the Commission and 
Council, it has been constricted because of the nature of their constituents. In order to make 
an agreement that is agreeable to his constituents, a Commissioner or Councilor must be able 
to satisfy both the Parliament and those responsible for his appointment in his home country. 
So the win-set of the individual is already constricted before the EC itself can decide upon 
the win-set. The overall EU win-set will be further constricted by the individual win-set 
imposed upon it by each Commissioner. By the time that the possible win-set is conveyed to 
the Liaison Office to Kosovo, it has been constricted from a theoretical win-set that includes 
all possible agreements.  
The imperfect nature of the conveyance of the win-set leads to confusion as to where 
a possible agreement might be made. As we have seen, the possible point where the EU will 
begin a visa dialogue with Kosovo has changed continuously. Because of the imperfect 
conveyance of the possible point where each individual level will accept an agreement, each 
successive level is uncertain as to what their constituents will accept. This point is not in and 
of itself of great concern. The problem occurs when there are so many levels and constituents 
that must be satisfied that the entire win-set structure is obscured and no one, inside or 
outside the structure, is quite sure where an agreement will be made. This is where Kosovo is 
right now with respect to visa liberalization. It seems as if no one in the EU is sure if, when, 
or where an agreement to open a visa dialogue will be reached.  
Furthering the difficulty associated with beginning the visa dialogue is the status of 
Kosovo’s sovereignty in the eyes of the EU member states. On this issue the lack of a 
consensus within the Council has serious ramifications for the policies goals that the EU 
might successfully pursue. One reason that the ICTY case is so unambiguous for the Council 
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that compliance has been made mandatory for the authorities in Kosovo is that it does not 
pre-suppose that Kosovo is independent and is thus not a controversial cause to support. 
Contrarily, visa liberalization implicitly supports the sovereignty of Kosovo as an entity 
separate from Serbia, which the non-recognizing EU states refuse to do. This split at the 
highest levels in the EU causes the difficulty in conveying the win-set to the Level I 
negotiators, because there is no consensus as to what the win-set is. In order for the Council 
to issue a clear win-set, the issues involved must look beyond the status of Kosovo and allow 
for an agreement among the Council members. Following the argument further, we can 
assume that areas upon which Kosovo will be able to make progress are those not tied to the 
question of the status of Kosovo’s sovereignty. Unfortunately, those areas that will bring 
Kosovo closer to EU membership are directly tied to the sovereignty of the state. As a 
consequence it seems as if Kosovo is not really on track for EU membership at all.  
Using this theoretical framework we can discuss the reasons for why no win-set exists 
that would allow for the beginning of a visa dialogue, but cannot comment on specific 
reasons. The most that we can say using two-level game theory is that the structure of the 
system concerning Kosovo makes it nearly impossible to figure out where an agreement 
might be made without a resolution go the status question. I would like to put forward several 
reasons that might explain the lack of specific comment from the EU about visas and 
Kosovo.  
One reason is that the Council does not want Kosovo to have visa-free travel to the 
Schengen zone. This desire is not as foolish as it might sound. At 0.7 percent of the 
population of Kosovo, the country had the highest proportion of asylum request by 
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population, and fifth by absolute numbers, of anywhere in the world to the EU in 2009.87 
Such pressures might be increased if the EU were to allow visa-free travel for Kosovar 
citizens. The fear of pressure is especially cogent when considering the anti-Eastern 
sentiment coming from many Western EU countries this past year and the forced return of 
many Roma from France to Eastern Europe.88 But if it were the case that the EU did not want 
Kosovo to begin visa-free travel to the EU, the EU might as well say so. It would not cost the 
EU any to tell Kosovo that visa-free travel is not in their future. In fact, Kosovo might then 
be able to redirect funds that are now going to fully update their visa practices for future 
liberalization to other projects that are more worthwhile and have an actual chance of 
success.  
Another reason is that all or some of the EU might actually want Kosovo to have 
visa-free travel but cannot effectively implement a strategy for such a policy. This scenario 
seems the most logical and plausible. The asylum requests discussed above tell only part of 
the story. Some countries feel the pinch of Eastern and non-European illegal residents more 
than others. Greece, France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands had the highest rate 
of removed illegal aliens in 2006.89 These countries will not want to increase the number of 
unwanted aliens in their countries by making it simpler for other poor Eastern Europeans to 
enter. For the other European countries, where illegal residents are not as much of an issue, 
they may want to allow the citizens of Kosovo to travel freely to the Schengen zone but 
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cannot override the will of those countries that do not. Such a situation within the EU leads to 
the confusion in the win-sets that were talked about above and seems to be a further reason 
for Kosovo having no actual plan for future visa liberalization.  
The problem though is that a Kosovo without a clear plan, one way or the other, 
toward visa liberalization with the EU is not without consequences. First, by treating Kosovo 
differently from the other countries in the region, the EU is creating a second class of 
countries within Europe: one with liberalized visa rules and one without. While it is true that 
the situation in Kosovo is different from that of other countries, if the EU wants a Kosovo 
that can function as a modern state in the future, it must start to treat Kosovo like one now. 
At the present rate it is becoming a state that is under international administration, but that 
international actors cannot effectively deal with. The fact that the EU cannot have effective 
relations with a territory that is under their supervision and that is supposedly on track for EU 
membership in the future will call into question the entire project of a common foreign 
policy. At present, the EU can only deal with Kosovo on issues that have no clear 
implications for sovereignty in either direction. 
Furthermore, the success of the largest ESDP mission to date is at stake. The goal of 
EULEX is to provide Kosovo with functioning institutions that can negotiate and have 
regular relations with other countries. The EU must be able to aid EULEX complete its 
mission of capacity building without constantly being caught up in the trap of the final status 
of Kosovo. If Kosovo cannot even function properly with the EU, with whom they share 
some responsibilities of sovereignty, with who else in the world will they? 
In this era of international administration, the factors that have made some areas of 
the administration better and others worse are easily teased out. The ICTY is successful in 
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implementing its mandate because its win-set is narrow and perfectly conveyed. The EU’s 
win-set, on the other hand, is so imperfectly defined that we cannot even tell if it is narrow or 
wide, though we assume that it is fairly narrow. More of the policies that the international 
actors that currently administer Kosovo are pursuing fall into categories more similar to that 
of visa liberalization than ICTY compliance, because the track is to bring Kosovo closer to 
the requirements of the acquis communitaire. And will thus be difficult to implement in 
Kosovo because of the confusion of the status of Kosovo’s sovereignty.  
The future of an internationally administered Kosovo is thus bleak indeed. The fact 
that more of the imposed reforms are unclear due to the structures of the institutions that 
implement them means that more reforms will follow the path of visa liberalization and fall 
into a limbo of reform. If the EU is serious about reforming Kosovo and turning it into a 
modern state, the reforms that it imposes must have a clear and narrow win-set. Accordingly, 
the EU will need to speak with a singular voice more akin to that of the ICTY than those that 
it has used thus far.  
The unitary structure of the ICTY gives it the ability to convey the initial win-set of 
the Prosecutor down to Kosovo on the ground nearly perfectly. The EU, on the other hand, 
has a more fractured structure. The fractured nature adds uncertainty to the size and 
placement of the overall EU win-set on visa liberalization. Because there is no certainty of 
the placement of the win-set, no agreement has the sure ability of being reached between the 
Kosovars and the EU on the issue of visa liberalization. Moreover, issues similar to visa 
liberalization that have a clear effect on the sovereignty issue will have the same roadblocks.  
Future forms of international administration should attempt to avoid the pitfalls that 
are now plaguing the EU in Kosovo. Since the structure of the international administration, 
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and indeed the EU itself, is so complex and multi-tiered, the overall win-set of the EU can be 
concealed by disagreements within the Union. The issue of Kosovo’s sovereignty is, at the 
moment, threatening to continue the process of international administration there indefinitely 
due to the inability of the EU to come to consensus on important reforms that need to 
implemented in Kosovo.  
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